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An analysis of public debt indicators in eight northern countries of
Latin America reveals that Nicaragua and Honduras are the most
vulnerable; Panama, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and El Salvador
are moderately vulnerable; while Mexico and Guatemala have debt levels
that are not considered dangerous. Nonetheless, a subsequent review of
four indicators of fiscal sustainability shows only Mexico to be well
positioned under all criteria; Costa Rica and Guatemala display a number
of minor problems, while various special circumstances explain the
favourable results obtained by Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic;
and El Salvador, Honduras and Panama will be unable to sustain their
2004 fiscal policy for very long. Lastly, analysis of the sensitivity of the
debt to a sudden stop in foreign capital inflows suggests the need for a
cautious attitude towards the future trend of the public debt in the face of
rising international interest rates.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 596
PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA  •  IGOR PAUNOVIC
I
Introduction
Thanks to the hopes kindled by macroeconomic and
structural reforms and the resumption of growth, the
fiscal sustainability of public debt has not been a
prominent item on government agendas in the eight
Northern Latin American countries for most of the
1990s and the first few years of the new millennium.
This could change, however, given the slow pace of
economic growth in 2000-2003 and the rise in
international interest rates since mid-2004. It is
therefore worth considering how vulnerable these eight
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the
Dominican Republic) are in macroeconomic terms.
The issue of public debt sustainability has recently
regained importance worldwide following a series of debt
restructurings or moratoria in countries as different as
Argentina, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine and
Uruguay. In response to these developments, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to develop
mechanisms to ensure an orderly resolution of future
debt crises. While these will serve in post-crisis situations,
an even more important task is to focus on the prevention
of debt crises. To highlight a number of worrying trends
in developing countries, the Fund devoted a chapter to
this topic in its World Economic Outlook, 2003 (IMF,
2003), and ECLAC included a chapter on public debt
sustainability in the region in its Economic Survey of
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003-2004 (ECLAC,
2004). The latter draws attention to the fact that the curve
reflecting the behaviour of such debt has been U-shaped
over the last 15 years; the debt as a percentage of GDP
declined from 1990 to 1996, before rebounding as from
1997. The latter period coincided with what ECLAC has
dubbed the “lost half-decade”.1
The fact that the debt is higher today than it was
seven years ago is not worrying in itself. Nonetheless,
the world economy is in the upswing of the business
cycle, following three years of very low growth, and
this phase of the cycle is usually accompanied by a
revival of inflation and a corresponding reaction by the
monetary authorities, with monetary tightening
reflected in a general rise in interest rates. A clear sign
of this sequence unfolding is the fact that the United
States Federal Reserve has been raising its benchmark
interest rate since mid-2004.
The phase of very low interest rates has therefore
come to an end, and the question now is how far rates
will rise and what the consequences will be for the
northern Latin American countries. If rates rise to a
moderate level and gradually, the debt is unlikely to
become a problem; but if they reach high levels and
very suddenly, then debt sustainability could become a
key economic policy issue.
Against this international backdrop, this article
examines the following set of questions: Are the
northern Latin American countries likely to suffer a debt
crisis in the next two or three years? Are public finance
trends in these countries sustainable? If not, what size
of fiscal adjustment would be needed to make them
sustainable? Given national and international
circumstances, what are the prospects for those
countries in terms of public debt? And lastly, which
countries are most vulnerable at the present time?
Section II of the article examines the public-debt
status of these eight countries and describes a number
of key debt indicators. These (both stock and flow
coefficients) are then compared with the international
thresholds suggested in the specialist literature. The
indicators, which represent ex post measures of
indebtedness, serve as an initial approach to the subject.
Section III analyses indicators of public debt
sustainability in the northern Latin American countries.
Of the numerous indicators of fiscal sustainability
proposed in theoretical studies, we chose four: the
Blanchard (1990) indicator, the macro-adjusted deficit
of Talvi and Végh (2000), the recursive algorithm of
Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003), and the currency-
mismatch indicator proposed by Calvo, Izquierdo and
Talvi (2003). As any analysis of public debt
sustainability is at the same time an analysis of fiscal
policy sustainability, it will also be possible to deduce
the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment needed to put
public finances on a sustainable path.
The author is grateful for valuable comments made by José
Octavio Martínez, Jorge Máttar, René Hernández and an anonymous
referee.
1 In fact, the public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2004 was higher
than the external debt as a percentage of GDP in 1982, when the
debt crisis broke. Carrera Troyano (2004) analyses this point in
greater detail.
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Section IV places the results of the two previous
sections in the broader setting of the macroeconomic
situation of the northern Latin American countries and
their international setting, both now and in the future.
The sensitivity of the debt is calculated in the
hypothetical case of a “sudden stop” in foreign capital
inflows, which translates into a sudden depreciation,
rising interest rates, growth slowdown, and the
conversion of contingent liabilities into public debt.
This indicates the order of magnitude of the fiscal
adjustments needed in the worst-case scenario, in
which the four adverse effects indicated above occur
simultaneously. Lastly, the paper analyses the
behaviour of several major sources of foreign
exchange, such as remittances, tourism and the
maquila industry.
Section V sets forth conclusions and policy
recommendations.
II
Public debt indicators in the
northern Latin America countries
Public debt indicators provide initial information on
debt sustainability. They are ex post indicators in the
sense that they compare observed facts with indicators
of sustainability, which in turn show ex ante the
magnitude of the permanent fiscal adjustment needed
to make the debt sustainable. The debt indicators
comprise both stock and flow coefficients and assist us
with international comparison. The World Bank, the
IMF and other financial institutions normally define
threshold values for a number of indicators, for early
warning and prevention purposes.
Public external debt accounts for over half of the
total external debt in all of the countries analysed (see
table 1). The smallest share is in Mexico (54%), and
the highest in Nicaragua (86%). What happens with
public debt therefore determines the trend of external
debt, and vice versa.2
Another important element is the share of short-
term debt in total external debt; and it is usually
considered that the economic authorities have no cause
for alarm provided this indicator is below 10%.
Nonetheless, the short-term debt accounts for over 10%
of the total in four of the eight countries analysed, and
it is approaching that level in another three, which
suggests a dynamic that could be dangerous in adverse
circumstances. Accordingly, bearing in mind the current
and future international situation, public debt trends
need to be analysed and continuously monitored.
Many debt analysts work with the net present value
of the debt rather than its nominal value, arguing that
this is a more precise figure since it shows how much
of the debt is concessional. For the same reason, the
debt is normally measured in net rather than gross terms,
with the Government’s liquid assets deducted. This
2 The economics literature has attempted to provide a theoretical
framework to explicate the link between public debt and external debt,
TABLE 1
Northern Latin American countries: public external debt and short-term
external debt as a proportion of total external debt, 2002
(Percentages)
Indicator/Country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican
Republic
Total external debt 64.9 80.9 77.9 78.1 54.0 86.0 77.2 64.5
Short-term debt/
Total external debt 31.0 17.0 19.9 9.7 7.0 8.5 4.5 32.3
Source: World Bank (2005).
but thus far the results have only been partial. See for example Horne
(1991), Parker and Kastner (1993), and Chalk and Hemming (2000).
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would be correct if figures were available on
unregistered liabilities that are implicit government
debts –a category that includes off-budget and
contingent liabilities, obligations arising from the social
security system, and others.3  Their effect is to raise the
debt/GDP ratio, but the lack of data on unregistered
liabilities in the countries analysed makes them
impossible to quantify. Accordingly, we believe that
gross nominal debt in relation to GDP is an indicator
that is less error-prone than the net debt or the net
present value of the debt.4  The uncertainty surrounding
the figures stems from methodological problems in the
accounting records of several of the eight countries
analysed. Dual accounting practices, omitting certain
fiscal operations from the records or using heterodox
fiscal accounting (as in Panama until recently), distort
the official figures and do not faithfully reflect the fiscal
reality of the public sector. Lastly, as problems of under-
recording are of an unknown magnitude but probably
significant, the best one can do is to draw attention to
the situation and use the nominal gross debt instead of
the net debt or its net present value.
One of the most widely used indicators is the total
public debt (domestic plus external) of the non-financial
public sector (NFPS) expressed as a percentage of GDP.
There is no consensus as to what level of debt is
dangerous, however, and the critical values vary widely
depending on the type of economy. A level deemed
acceptable for industrialized countries is considered too
dangerous for developing countries. For example, one
of the Maastricht Treaty criteria for European Union
countries to adopt the common currency required public
debt to be below 60% of GDP. In contrast, the IMF (2003)
argues that the sustainable level of public debt in
emerging economies is just 25% of GDP.
This very low level, while controversial, reflects
the changes that have occurred in the international
economy over the last 35 years. In an increasingly
globalized world, in which financial capital crosses
national borders without difficulty, international
macroeconomic and financial stability is a global public
good. Nonetheless, this public good is currently in very
short supply worldwide.5  As a result, the existing
international financial architecture forces countries to
assume the cost of macroeconomic stability
individually, a task which recently proved burdensome
even for Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea,
whose macroeconomic management is exemplary.
Be that as it may, we live in a world where the
problem of public debt sustainability is seen as
pertaining exclusively to individual countries, so almost
inevitably one must accept that the critical value for
such sustainability is just 25% of GDP. Another threshold
level recommended by the Fund (IMF, 2002) is 40% of
GDP. Below this proportion, the likelihood of a debt crisis
occurring is under 5%; but when the level of the debt
surpasses the equivalent of 40% of GDP, the probability
of crisis climbs to a range of 15%-20%. In other words,
the relation between the likelihood of a debt crisis and
the level of the debt is non-linear,6  which makes it even
more important to analyse the level of the debt and its
sustainability.
How are the northern Latin American countries
placed in this regard? Figure 1 shows the debt of the
non-financial public-sector as a proportion of GDP for
the eight countries studied.7  Three countries have a
higher debt level than the average for Latin America
and the Caribbean as a whole; and two of them,
Nicaragua and Honduras, have been admitted to the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
Panama also has a relatively high level of debt. Levels
of around 48% of GDP in Costa Rica and the Dominican
Republic, and 42% in El Salvador, place these countries
above the critical 40% mark, but below the Maastricht
Treaty criterion. Mexico is the only country where a
debt crisis seems very unlikely, while Guatemala is the
only country that fulfils the very stringent sustainability
requirement of public debt below 25% of GDP.
In addition to the proportion of GDP, another key
indicator is the total public debt in relation to public-
sector income (figure 2). A given level of public debt as
a proportion of GDP may vary greatly in relation to public
revenues. Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic clearly
illustrate this with their debt/GDP ratios both around 48%
in 2004, but ratios of debt/public-sector income of 136%
and 294%, respectively. This reflects the different sizes
of the State in the two countries, and serves to nuance
3 Further details on this can be found in ECLAC (1998) and IMF (2002).
4 One of the most perverse characteristics of contingent liabilities
is their asymmetric occurrence. In good times they mostly remain
contingent, but in bad times a high proportion of them move out of
that category and become public debt. In a catastrophic crisis such
as the external debt crisis of the 1980s, even private debts become
public debt, especially those of the financial sector.
5 See ECLAC (2002), for example.
6 Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002) also find a non-linear relation
between external debt and economic growth, specifically, that the
impact of the external debt on growth becomes negative above a debt
level of 35%-40% of GDP and/or 160%-170% of the value of exports.
7 Except for the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, which only
report central government figures.
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the debt/GDP indicator by indicating the burden on the
Treasury’s revenue-generating capacity.
Another important indicator is the ratio between
public external debt and exports of goods and
services (figure 3). A threshold of 150% was used to
identify countries eligible for admission to the HIPC
initiative, although measured through the net present
value of the public external debt. This provides an
indicator of the burden on exports, i.e. on the
economy’s foreign-exchange-earning capacity. In
this regard, the Dominican Republic is one of the
countries with the greatest capacity to generate foreign
exchange, in contrast to the conclusions drawn from the
previous two indicators. Mexico is the best placed
country, with Nicaragua and Honduras at the other
extreme.
It is also necessary to compare debt amortization
with new debt disbursements (figure 4). If this
“revolving ratio” is above 100, existing debt is not
refinanced by new borrowing; but if the indicator is
below 100, old debt is being refinanced with new,
thereby prolonging the prevailing debt dynamic.
Unfortunately, no northern Latin American country is
on the “right” side of this indicator (i.e. over 100).
Mexico is best placed, almost reaching the critical value,
with Costa Rica and El Salvador also relatively close.
The fact that other countries are way below the threshold
flags a potentially dangerous trend in the future in the
absence of radical changes.
The level of interest payments on the public debt
in relation to GDP shows how burdensome such
payments are for the country (figure 5). The critical
FIGURE 2
Northern Latin American countries: public debt as a percentage
of public-sector revenue, 2004
Source: Author’s calculations, on the basis of official figures.
FIGURE 1
Northern Latin American countries: debt of the non-financial public sector
as a percentage of GDP, 2004
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Northern Latin American countries: interest payments on the public debt
as a percentage of GDP, 2004
FIGURE 3
Northern Latin American countries: public external debt as a percentage
of exports of goods and services, 2004
FIGURE 4
Northern Latin American countries: ratio between debt amortization
and new disbursements, 2004
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value mentioned in the specialist literature is 3% of
GDP. On this basis, Costa Rica and Panama are on the
wrong side of the threshold. As these two countries also
have the highest share of domestic debt in total public
debt,8  it can be inferred that the interest rates they pay
on domestic debt are relatively high.
Table 2 displays the indicators analysed along with
several others that may be of interest, such as the net
international reserves held by central banks in relation
to public external debt, public external debt service as
a proportion of exports of goods and services, and
others. All of these indicators provide valuable
information on the scale of public indebtedness and
can be used to assess potential risks in the near future.
The debt indicators of these eight countries reflect
their tremendous variety. Nicaragua and Honduras would
appear to be in the most problematic situation, although
the rules of the game for them are different since both are
already included in the HIPC initiative. These two countries
also have adjustment programmes in place with the IMF,
in which a major component is devoted to fiscal tightening.
The second group includes Costa Rica, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador and Panama, whose indicators
display major vulnerability, but not extreme as in the first
group. This could become a problem if the currently
favourable conditions were to worsen significantly. Lastly,
Mexico and Guatemala are a group apart, given that their
indicators do not indicate a dangerous level of debt.
8 Except for Nicaragua.
TABLE 2
Northern Latin American countries: indicators of public debt, 2004
Costa El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican
Rica Republic
External debt/GDP 21.1 30.2 14.3 68.3 11.5 118.3 52.6 33.9
Domestic debt/GDP 26.6 11.9 6.2 4.3 13.4 29.4 20.4 14.3
Total public debt/GDP 47.7 42.1 20.5 72.6 25.0 147.7 73.0 48.2
Total public debt/public-sector revenue 135.9 283.2 186.2 210.9 107.7 54.0 334.7 293.9
External debt/exports 45.5 111.1 83.4 189.0 38.5 449.3 83.8 68.7
Net international reserves/external debt 51.6 39.5 89.4 33.0 78.8 8.0 … 9.4
External debt service/exports 12.8 22.0 10.0 18.5 12.8 6.4 12.8 15.5
External interest payments/exports 2.8 7.0 4.1 2.5 4.7 9.4 5.7 3.8
Amortization/disbursements
(external debt) 86.7 82.7 42.3 19.0 98.9 22.4 46.5 60.4
External interest payments/GDP 1.3 1.9 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.6 3.6 1.9
Domestic interest payments/GDP 3.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.7 0.4
Total interest payments/GDP 4.5 2.3 1.1 1.9 2.3 2.2 4.3 2.3
Total public debt per capita (in dollars) 2  065 985 436 719 1 594 1 227 3 016 997
Source: Author’s calculations, on the basis of official figures.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 7  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 5102
PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY IN THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA  •  IGOR PAUNOVIC
III
Indicators of fiscal sustainability
1. Theoretical issues underlying these indicators
Economic theory states that the results of current fiscal
policies satisfy the solvency condition when future
primary surpluses are equal to the public debt, both
variables being measured in net present value terms.9
This means that the Government is solvent on an
intertemporal basis, since it can persist with its current
policies. Nonetheless, this condition does not easily
translate into an operational indicator, for future primary
surpluses cannot be known in advance. Moreover, as
Horne (1991) points out, government solvency is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for current fiscal
policy to be sustainable. The future behaviour of the
private sector is also relevant, since this determines
future rates of interest and economic growth.
To avoid these problems, the specialist literature
has proposed simpler indicators that have far less
demanding data requirements than those based on the
concept of intertemporal solvency.10  Nonetheless,
indicators of this type lack a clear theoretical basis for
their construction. One of the most serious problems is
their arbitrary nature; in general they measure the effort
needed to keep the debt/GDP ratio at its current level,
but that level might either be too high or too low, and
these indicators provide no criteria for judging this.
Accordingly, they have to be considered along with the
debt indicators presented in section II.
2. Four fiscal sustainability indicators
in the northern countries of Latin America
We now present four indicators of sustainability, each
of which highlights an element that is relevant to
sustainability analysis. The first is the short-term
primary gap (Blanchard, 1990) which indicates the level
of the permanent primary balance11  needed to stabilize
the debt relative to GDP at its current level:




) b – sp (1)
where sp* is the permanent primary balance needed to
stabilize the debt, sp is the existing primary balance,  r
t
is the trend real interest rate, n
t
 is the trend rate of GDP
growth, and b is the debt/GDP ratio. If the permanent
primary balance is larger than the current primary
balance, the primary gap is positive. This means that
fiscal policy is unsustainable, because it tends to
increase the level of debt in relation to GDP. In the
opposite situation, where the permanent primary
balance is below the current primary balance, fiscal
policy tends to reduce the debt/GDP ratio.
Table 3 shows data on the primary balance prevailing
in 2004, the required primary balance in 2004, the trend
primary balance, the trend primary gap and the required
primary gap in 2004. The trend primary balance and the
trend primary gap are indicators proposed by Blanchard
along with the trend growth rate over the last 10 years12
and the real interest rate over the last 10 years. We use
the “implicit” interest rate, which is calculated as debt
interest payments as a percentage of the debt balance
outstanding in the previous period, as suggested in ECLAC
(2004). Specifically, the real interest rate was calculated
as the weighted average of interest rates on domestic
and external debt:
(2)
where is the interest rate on the domestic debt, is
the domestic debt service/GDP ratio in the previous
period, is the total public debt/GDP ratio in the
previous period, is the interest rate on public external
debt, and is the public external debt/GDP ratio in
the previous period.13
9 See for example Horne (1991), Talvi and Végh (2000).
10 Another line of research on sustainability uses econometric
methods. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on how the problem
of sustainability should be analysed (Chalk and Hemming, 2000).
Access to large amounts of data is needed to afford sufficient degrees
of freedom, which is a prohibitive requirement for many developing
countries. For these two reasons we do not explore that line of
research here.
11 The primary balance is the difference between total revenue and
total expenditure excluding interest payments.
12 The trend growth rate was estimated in the usual way using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter with α = 100.
13 The real domestic interest rate was calculated using the variation
in the consumer price index. To obtain the external real interest
rate, we used the variation of the unit value of merchandise exports,
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We also made a minor change to the Blanchard
indicator, by calculating the primary gap using data on
economic growth and the real interest rate in 2004. We
call this indicator the required primary balance in 2004.
Whereas the traditional Blanchard indicator reflects the
primary balance with “normalized” data over at least
one business cycle, our modification captures short-
term conditions prevailing in the year for which the
indicator is calculated. This can be useful both to
support its status as a suitable indicator for capturing
specific or temporary conditions, and to compare it with
more “normal” conditions reflected by the indicator of
the trend primary balance.
 When interpreting the results, the special
characteristics of the current situation need to be borne
in mind, since interest rates are at a very low level, while
GDP growth is relatively high. For that reason, the trend
primary gap is a better indicator than the required
primary gap in 2004. For greater clarity, table 3 also
presents data on the trend implicit real interest rate, the
implicit real interest rate in 2004, the trend growth rate
and real growth rate in 2004. As can be seen, the trend
implicit real interest rate in 2004 is above the implicit
real interest rate in all cases, whereas the trend growth
rate is above the real growth rate in 2004 in just four
countries. In the other four, the trend growth rate is
below the real growth rate recorded in 2004. Lastly,
the implicit real interest rate in 2004 is below the real
growth rate in 2004 in six of the eight countries. For
these reasons, the required primary balance in 2004 in
most cases is less than the existing balance.
In the case of Costa Rica these results show that
fiscal policy is tending to stabilize the level of public
debt in 2004, because the current primary balance is
greater than both the trend and the required primary
balances. Nonetheless, it is worrying that the country
spends over 4% of GDP each year on interest payments.
In 2004, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama have
positive primary and required gaps, so if they persist
with their current fiscal policy, public debt will grow
as a percentage of GDP.14 In contrast, the results for
Guatemala and Mexico show that current fiscal policy
is sustainable.
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic are to some
extent special cases. The required primary balance in
2004 for Nicaragua is heavily biased by the real interest
rate, which is negative as a result of the country's minimal
interest payments, given debt payment arrears and
payments condoned under the HIPC initiative. Another
significant factor is the relatively high growth rate (5.1%),
which is reflected in the negative required primary
balance. Both factors also appear in the case of the trend
primary balance. In contrast, in the Dominican Republic
the positive primary balance recorded in 2004 stems from
the inadequate coverage of the country's published fiscal
data, which only reports the result of central government
and excludes the central bank's quasi-fiscal deficit. As
the latter was around 4% of GDP in 2004, a broader
coverage of fiscal policy results would prove less
flattering. Nonetheless, the country made major efforts
to regain macroeconomic policy credibility following the
banking crisis of May 2003. The required primary
TABLE 3
Northern Latin American countries: indicators of the primary gap
and the existing primary balance, 2004
(Percentages and percentages of GDP)
Indicator/country Costa El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican
Rica Republic
Primary balance existing in 2004 0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.1 2.5 2.0 -0.7 3.9
Trend implicit interest rate 4.9 5.4 5.1 13.2 1.6 1.4 6.6 3.0
Implicit interest rate in 2004 2.8 4.7 1.3 8.8 1.1 -4.6 4.9 -4.4
Trend growth rate 4.6 3.6 3.7 3.0 3.0 4.2 3.9 4.8
Real growth rate in 2004 4.2 1.5 2.7 5.0 4.4 5.1 6.2 2.0
Trend primary balance 0.1 0.7 0.3 7.4 -0.4 -4.1 1.9 -0.9
Required primary balance in 2004 -0.7 1.3 -0.3 2.8 -0.8 -14.4 -0.9 -3.1
Trend primary gap -0.4 0.9 0.0 7.3 -2.8 -6.0 2.6 -4.8
Required primary gap in 2004 -1.2 1.5 -0.5 2.6 -3.3 -16.3 -0.2 -7.0
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
14 Panama partially escapes this conclusion with the negative
required primary gap in 2004. Nonetheless, the growth rate in 2004
was 6.2%, higher than the implicit interest rate (4.9%); so the
question is for how long this situation can last, given the fact that
interest rates are rising.
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balance in 2004 is also negative because the real interest
rate paid by the country on its domestic debt was negative.
Inflation, which had reached the annual rate of 60% at
the start of 2004 and has been decreasing since then,
was the cause of the real negative interest rate in 2004.
Lastly, with the more usual parameter values (the very
high growth in the 1990s), the Dominican Republic
should not have debt sustainability problems: figures for
the trend primary surplus suggest that it could indulge
in negative primary balances of up to 4.8% of GDP and
still maintain the level of its debt as a proportion of GDP.
This indicator therefore suggests that fiscal policy
is sustainable in Costa Rica, Mexico and Guatemala.15
The cases of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic
should be interpreted with care, bearing in mind their
special circumstances. According to the Blanchard
indicator, the other countries analysed need to take
action to return to a fiscal sustainability path.
The second indicator of fiscal sustainability explored
in this paper is the macro-adjusted primary deficit
proposed by Talvi and Végh (2000). The underlying
motivation for this indicator is the great volatility
displayed by macroeconomic variables in Latin America,
which means that the deficit at a given moment may differ
greatly from what it would be under normal
macroeconomic conditions. To solve this problem, the
authors propose calculating a macro-adjusted primary
deficit, which reflects what would occur if the economy
followed its long-term path (i.e. GDP at its potential level,
fiscal revenues unaffected by short-term situations, etc).
The basic idea behind this indicator is to contrast
the macro-adjusted deficit with the deficit that results
from considering interest payments actually accruing
at a given moment, in conjunction with the country's
debt level and growth rate at that moment. The indicator
is defined as:
(3)
where r is the real interest rate for the year being
analysed, g is the real growth rate in that year, and is
the macro-adjusted primary deficit, i.e. the deficit that
would result under normal macroeconomic
conditions.16 The problem with this indicator is deciding
what exactly are the “normal” conditions for an
economy. The authors suggest identifying such
conditions through a very detailed analysis performed
by experts. We, however, employ a relatively simple
procedure for the eight economies studied: as a proxy
for normal conditions, we use the indicators of the trend
GDP gap for each country to identify years when the
gap between real GDP and trend GDP was smallest. We
then take the primary balance of that year and enter it
as the macro-adjusted primary balance in table 4. We
also include data on interest payments as a percentage
of GDP for illustrative purposes.
As equation (3) shows, fiscal policy sustainability
requires this indicator to be no larger than zero,
otherwise the debt will be unsustainable through time.
The indicator of the adjustment needed in 2004 is
negative in all countries except Honduras, which was
therefore the only country in which fiscal policy was
unsustainable in that year. The special conditions that
gave rise to these results (low interest rates and relatively
high growth) were explained previously with the results
obtained using the Blanchard indicator. The burden of
debt service, even at times of low interest rates, is thus
important. Nonetheless, thanks to the fiscal
consolidation efforts that have been made, most
countries are in a sustainable situation under current
conditions.
The third indicator of fiscal responsibility,
proposed by Croce and Juan-Ramón (2003), is based
on a recursive algorithm derived from the pattern of
movement of the debt/GDP ratio, given the reaction
function of the fiscal authorities. In simple terms, the
fiscal authorities decide upon a certain level of public
debt in relation to GDP, and calculate the primary surplus





 is the indicator of fiscal sustainability, sp° is
the primary balance that will prevail once the target
debt/GDP ratio is attained, and b° is the level of the debt/
GDP ratio that the authorities want to achieve. As the
debt levels desired by the fiscal authorities in the eight
countries are unknown, we decided to set a uniform
target for all countries of lowering the debt/GDP ratio
by 10 percentage points. This is obviously excessively
restrictive in the case of Guatemala, and too lax in the
case of Nicaragua, apart from being entirely arbitrary.
Nonetheless, the exercise gives an idea of how the fiscal
sustainability indicator works (table 5).
15 These conclusions need to be nuanced by the previous note on
data quality. If the data used do not faithfully and fully capture the
country's fiscal reality, sustainability indicators tend to be less
useful. Unfortunately, there is no way to quantify the discrepancy
between the official figures and fiscal reality.
16 Exclusively for the purpose of constructing this indicator, we
define the deficit as the difference between expenditure and revenue,
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What is important is that this indicator should have
an absolute value of less than 1. If this condition is
fulfilled, the country will be in a position to reduce its
public debt/GDP ratio to the proposed level, in our case
a reduction of 10 percentage points. Consequently,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Mexico and
Nicaragua could achieve this target without major
changes in their fiscal policy, while the other countries
could not. Guatemala, with an indicator of exactly 1, is
a borderline case. The proponents of this indicator
suggest calculating it every three months, once the
Government decides the level of public debt it wishes
to achieve, to be able to adjust fiscal policy. This would
make it possible to track the trend of sustainability on
a quarterly basis, taking account of the public debt
target, and make timely adjustments.
The fourth and last indicator of fiscal sustainability
presented in this paper is the currency-mismatch
indicator proposed by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi
(2003). These authors start from the fact that
macroeconomic variables in Latin America are
extremely volatile, and capital flows even more so.
Accordingly, a key factor in debt sustainability is its
composition (which currencies it consists of and in what
proportion) compared to the composition of national
output (tradable vs. non-tradable). The authors claim
that this indicator is essential for understanding the
crisis of 1998-2002 in Argentina, which triggered the
debt default.
The mismatch indicator compares the ratio of
external to domestic debt with the ratio of tradable and
nontradable goods production in the economy. At one
extreme the result is a perfect match (the indicator has
value of 1), when the share of tradables in GDP is the
same as the share of external debt in total public debt.
At the other extreme there is total mismatch, with an
indicator of 0. The indicator is constructed by breaking
down the debt into its domestic and external
components, and GDP into tradable and nontradable
sectors:
(5)
where B is the debt in terms of nontradables,  e is the
real exchange rate,  B* is the debt in terms of tradables,
Y is the GDP of nontradable goods, Y* is the GDP of
tradables.17 Calculating the ratio between nontradable
debt/tradable debt and nontradable GDP/tradable GDP,
gives the indicator of currency mismatch (I
dm
 ) which
takes values between 0 and 1:
(6)
TABLE 4
Northern Latin American countries: macro-adjusted primary deficit
and required deficit, 2004
(Percentages and percentages of GDP)
Dominican
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama
Republic
Interest payments/GDP 4.5 2.3 1.1 1.9 2.3 2.2 4.3 2.3
Macro-adjusted primary deficit -4.5 -3.1 -0.3 0.0 -3.5 -2.3 -3.4 0.0
Value of the indicator in 2004 -5.12 -1.75 -0.58 2.66 -4.32 -20.19 -4.18 -3.38
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
TABLE 5
Northern Latin American countries: indicator of fiscal sustainability, 2004
(Percentages of GDP)
Dominican
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama
Republic
Target total debt/GDP ratio 37.7 33.0 10.3 62.6 15.0 138.0 63.0 38.1
Target primary balance/GDP ratio 0.1 0.6 0.1 6.2 -0.2 -3.7 1.6 -0.7
Fiscal sustainability indicator 0.96 1.09 1.00 1.62 0.74 0.87 1.52 0.68














17 The proponents of this indicator suggest representing the latter
variable by exports of goods and services.
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For El Salvador and Panama, which use the dollar
as their currency, this indicator clearly makes no sense,
because public-sector revenue is in the same currency
as most of its debt (table 6). For other countries,
however, it is very important. Costa Rica is best placed,
thanks to its larger share of domestic debt in total public
debt and the fact that it is more open to trade than the
other countries. The indicator is also at an acceptable
level in Mexico.18 In contrast, the Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua display significant
or even serious currency mismatch. In the case of
Guatemala, however, this is not a major problem, thanks
to the low level of its public debt in relation to GDP.
3. What conclusions can be drawn from the review
of various indicators of fiscal sustainability?
Of the Northern Latin American countries, only Mexico
is well placed under all criteria.19 In that country, the
primary balance recorded in 2004 was greater than that
needed to keep public debt/GDP ratio at the same level,
currency mismatch is acceptable, and fiscal policy is
sustainable according to the macro-adjusted primary
deficit indicator. The results in other countries are less
encouraging, however.
A second group of countries consists of Costa Rica
and Guatemala. In the former, the problem is the size
of the debt stock, rather than the flow of debt, and the
high level of interest payments. In Guatemala on the
other hand, the only problem is the serious currency
mismatch.
Special circumstances, including negative interest
rates, explain the favourable results displayed by the
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. In the former case,
with the parameters recorded over the last 15 years,
the country could overcome problems of public debt
sustainability without major difficulty. Nonetheless, it
remains to be seen whether its high GDP growth rates
can be repeated in the future. It is therefore hard to
correctly evaluate sustainability in these two countries.
El Salvador, Honduras and Panama cannot sustain
the fiscal policy prevailing in 2004 for very long, as
this would raise the public debt/GDP ratio. Honduras
and Nicaragua also display significant currency
mismatch, which could be a further aggravating factor
in any future debt crisis. The fact that Honduras and
Nicaragua are included in the HIPC initiative softens
these conclusions, however, since their debt is subject
to different rules of the game.
Lastly, four countries would need to take additional
measures if they wanted to reduce their public debt/GDP
ratios by 10 percentage points. Overall, the public debt
sustainability situation is not alarming, but there are amber
lights suggesting the need for permanent monitoring.
TABLE 6
Northern Latin American countries: indicator of currency mismatch, 2004
(Percentages and ratios)
Indicator/country CostaRica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama D. Republic
B/eB* 2.90 ... 0.60 0.15 1.14 0.42 ... 1.03
Y/eY* 3.70 ... 7.90 4.70 2.20 5.30 ... 4.00
Indicator of currency mismatch 0.78 ... 0.08 0.03 0.51 0.08 ... 0.26
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
18 Martner and Tromben (2004) suggest that a level of about 0.5
for this indicator can be considered reasonable.
19 Once again, these conclusions need to be nuanced for all
countries, to take account of problems such as the under-recording
as mentioned above.
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IV
Sensitivity of public debt to external shocks
Macroeconomic volatility in Latin America means that
fiscal sustainability indicators can change abruptly in
a very short space of time. For example, public debt in
the Dominican Republic doubled as a percentage of
GDP in 2003 as a result of the banking crisis and its
effects on macroeconomic variables, such as recession,
depreciation of the real exchange rate, interest rate hikes
and bailout of the banking system. Similar elements
can be seen in the crises suffered recently by Argentina
(Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003) and Uruguay (Rial
and Vicente, 2004). Accordingly, it is of paramount
importance to analyse the sensitivity of the public debt
to external shocks such as those suffered, for example,
by Argentina: i.e. “sudden stop” in external capital
flows, to use the terminology of Calvo, Izquierdo and
Talvi (2003).
These authors define “sudden stop” as an
unexpected and prolonged halt to capital flows. One
such episode followed the Russian crisis of August
1998, with major repercussions especially in southern
cone countries. One of the effects of sudden stop is
usually a significant depreciation of the real exchange
rate, which raises the public external debt/GDP ratio and
consequently the total public debt/GDP ratio, thereby
complicating debt service. Negative shocks are
particularly intense in countries that have a significant
currency mismatch between debt and income, which
can even trigger a cessation of debt payments. The
shock is propagated in the economy through a rise in
interest rates, and translates into low economic growth
or even recession. At the same time, the fiscal situation
worsens because of the increase in debt service,
reduction in fiscal revenues and conversion of
contingent liabilities into public debt. This dangerous
mix can have catastrophic consequences, as happened
in Argentina in 2002.
Although this section will analyse the effects of a
catastrophic “sudden-stop” shock, the analysis should
not be confused with real events. The fact that
international interest rates have started to rise does not
mean that we foresee a sudden stop in the region. Rather,
the rise in interest rates is a sign that the macroeconomic
environment is becoming less benign. In this new
environment there could be other positive or negative
factors that are unrelated to sudden stop. One such is
the high price of oil, which has particularly harmful
effects in seven of the eight countries analysed. Another
could be the rise in commodity prices, which is likely
to cause an additional deterioration of the terms of trade,
or slower growth than that recorded in the 1990s. All
of this makes the ensuing analysis somewhat
hypothetical. Nonetheless, it provides us with the order
of magnitude of the fiscal adjustment needed in the
worst-case scenario, i.e. when the four adverse effects
of sudden stop occur simultaneously.
To ascertain the possible effects of shocks of this
type in the northern Latin American countries, we
performed four simulations whose results are presented
below. The individual effects of each shock should be
added together, because in the event of a sudden stop
in external capital flows the four usually occur together.
The specialist literature makes various assumptions in
calculating the sensitivity of the debt. Melhado (2003),
for example, calculates the effects on public debt
assuming a real depreciation of 30%, lower growth (the
historical rate of GDP growth minus two standard
deviations) and a rise in interest rates (the historical
average plus 2 standard deviations). Yamauchi (2004)
visualizes GDP growth decreasing by two percentage
points, and the interest rate rising by 200 basis points.
Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2003) use a real
depreciation of 50%, which is more consistent with the
experience of southern cone countries over the last
seven years. They also calculate changes assuming a
200 basis-point rise in interest rates and a one-
percentage-point reduction in the growth rate.
We wanted to gauge the sensitivity of public debt
in response to a 50% depreciation of the real exchange
rate. Our second assumption is a reduction of the growth
rate by two standard deviations in relation to the rates
recorded from 1980 to the present. The third assumption
is a 200 basis-point rise in the implicit interest rate -
not particularly extreme since this was the norm in many
Latin American countries between 1998 and 2002. The
fourth and last assumption is an increase in public debt
equivalent to 10 percentage points of GDP, resulting from
the conversion of contingent liabilities into public debt.
We calculate all of these effects with Blanchard
indicators in their original form (using the trend growth
rate and real interest rate over the last 10 years) and
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with the required primary balance using real data for
2004, in both cases adjusted for the various
assumptions.
Table 7 shows the impact of a real depreciation of
50% on the public debt. In the case of El Salvador and
Panama there are clearly no changes since they are
dollarized economies. We then calculated the primary
balance needed to maintain this level of debt under the
conditions prevailing in 2004, and the average conditions
of the last 10 years (the required trend primary balance).
These results replicate the pattern noted in the
previous section. Costa Rica, Guatemala and Mexico
recorded primary balances in 2004 that are sufficient to
overcome the effects of a real depreciation of 50%. El
Salvador, Honduras and Panama are at the other extreme,
since the required balances are greater than those
recorded in 2004. Lastly, Nicaragua and the Dominican
Republic have positive results, but the warning made at
the end of section III is again valid here.
The effects of a sudden stop in foreign capital flows
would be more than just a change in relative prices in
the form of a steep depreciation. There would also be a
slowdown in GDP growth which might even be dramatic,
as happened in Argentina where GDP shrank by roughly
11% in 2002. We use a less drastic assumption, in which
growth declines by two standard deviations.20 Growth
is calculated using the rate recorded in 2004 and trend
growth as the base. Given that the GDP growth slowdown
compounds the effect of the real depreciation, the
magnitude of the necessary fiscal adjustment increases
with the calculations shown in table 8.
An additional effect suffered by countries in crisis
is a rise in interest rates (table 9). As Calvo, Izquierdo
and Talvi (2003) note, a 200 basis-point rise in interest
rates lasting several years cannot be considered an
isolated event. In fact, spreads in the emerging markets
bond index (EMBI)21  stayed more than 200 basis points
above their pre-1998-Russian-crisis level throughout
TABLE 7
Northern Latin American countries: sensitivity of public debt
to a real depreciation of 50%
(Percentages and percentages of GDP)
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican  Rep.
Imputed public debt
with 50% depreciation 59.5 43.0 27.5 106.8 30.8 207.3 73.0 65.1
Primary balance
observed in 2004 0.5 -0.2 0.2 0.1 2.5 2.0 -0.7 3.9
Required primary
balance -1.3 2.3 -0.6 4.0 -3.5 -22.1 -0.2 -8.1
Trend required
primary balance -0.3 0.9 0.2 10.7 -2.9 -7.8 2.7 -5.1
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
20 The standard deviation was calculated for the period 1980-2003.
TABLE 8
Northern Latin American countries: sensitivity of the public debt
to a growth slowdown amounting to two standard deviations
(Percentages and percentages of GDP)
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican Rep.
Growth in 2004 minus
2 standard deviations 2.4 -1.9 0.0 4.4 2.8 -0.7 3.8 0.0
Trend growth minus 2
standard deviations 2.8 0.3 1.0 2.4 1.4 -1.6 1.5 2.9
Required primary balance -0.3 3.0 0.2 4.6 -3.0 -10.2 1.5 -6.8
Trend required primary balance 0.7 2.4 0.9 11.4 -2.4 4.2 4.4 -3.8
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
21 EMBI: Emerging Markets Bond Index.
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2001. We added 200 basis points to the implicit interest-
rate in 2004 and to the trend implicit interest-rate. With
this modification we then calculated the required
primary balance and the required trend primary balance,
which, as expected, continue to rise.
The final calculation involved adding in the effect
of contingent liabilities (table 10). In a crisis situation,
a high proportion of contingent liabilities become public
debt. For that reason we assumed an increase in public
debt of 10 percentage points of GDP. The fact that bank
bailouts are very costly (in the Dominican Republic in
2003 they absorbed 20% of GDP) means that our
assumption is not exaggerated. As before, this is added
to the previous adverse effects.
This simultaneity of adverse effects is crucial to
an understanding of how dangerous sudden stops in
foreign capital inflows can be. If all macroeconomic
variables deteriorate at the same time, the authorities
have very little room for manoeuvre. It is therefore
important to try to avoid events of this type, among
other things through a prudent borrowing policy. For
the countries analysed, the total adjustment of public
finances (i.e. the balance required to keep the public
debt/GDP ratio at the same level, and also deal with the
four effects of a potential sudden stop) vary between
-1.6% of GDP in Mexico to 14.8% of GDP in Honduras,
taking account of the trend primary balance. Once
again, the data for the Dominican Republic, which did
not include the enormous central bank quasi-fiscal
deficit, heavily bias the result. When that deficit is
included, the required trend primary balance becomes
positive (1.7% of GDP). In the end, taking the four effects
into account, only Mexico is unequivocally in a
satisfactory situation; the Dominican Republic escapes
thanks to the circumstances described, but Nicaragua
is unlikely to escape because its balance is below the
trend balance required.
What other alternatives do the economic authorities
have available to them? The answer depends on the
individual circumstances of each country, but our
sensitivity analysis of the debt can provide some clues.
Table 11 shows the relative importance of each of the
four adverse effects discussed above. Specifically, we
subtract the trend primary balance in 2004 in the
absence of sudden stop from the trend primary balance
indicated in table 10. As the difference represents the
result of the four effects analysed, we then calculate
the percentage contribution made by each one.
TABLE 9
Northern Latin American countries: sensitivity of public debt
to a rise in interest rates
(Percentages and percentages of GDP)
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican Rep.
Implicit interest rate in
2004 + 200 basis points 4.8 6.7 3.3 10.8 3.1 -2.6 6.9 -2.4
Real (implicit) interest rate
+200 basis points 6.9 7.4 7.1 15.2 3.6 3.4 8.6 5.0
Required primary balance 0.9 3.8 0.7 6.8 -2.4 -6.0 3.0 -5.5
Trend required primary balance 1.9 3.2 1.5 13.5 -1.8 8.3 5.9 -2.5
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
TABLE 10
Northern Latin American countries: sensitivity of the public debt
to an increase in debt arising from contingent liabilities
(Percentages of GDP)
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican Rep.
Debt with contingent
liabilities (+10% of GDP) 69.5 52.1 37.5 116.8 40.8 217.3 83.0 75.1
Required primary balance 1.2 4.7 1.1 7.4 -2.4 -6.2 3.3 -5.7
Trend required primary balance 2.3 3.9 2.1 14.8 -1.6 8.8 6.6 -2.3
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
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The data vary enormously from country to
country;22  the difference caused by sudden stop is just
1.2% of GDP in the case of Mexico, but almost 15% of
GDP in the case of Nicaragua. In most cases, sudden
stop would require a fiscal adjustment of between 2%
and 7% of GDP. Given their relative weight in the
deterioration of the fiscal situation, two of the four
adverse effects of sudden stop play a leading role. The
first is slower growth, which is the most important
variable in all the countries analysed apart from
Honduras. The second most important is the rise in
interest rates, which is particularly relevant since we
are in a period of rising international interest rates. The
other two effects are less important.
How can this public-debt sensitivity analysis be
placed in a broader macroeconomic setting? As we have
seen, economic growth is one of the most important
variables for public-debt sustainability. In that regard,
the situation of the eight countries is neither one of
exuberance nor is it critical. According to projections
contained in the Economic Survey of Latin America and
the Caribbean 2004-2005 (ECLAC 2005), these economies
are likely to record moderate growth on average in 2005-
2006 (table 12), albeit below the average for Latin
America and the Caribbean as a whole, which is enjoying
an economic boom following six years of sluggish
growth. Two of the eight countries studied (El Salvador
and Guatemala) are growing moderately, barely enough
to keep pace with demographic expansion. In contrast,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama display higher growth
rates, which should help reduce the indicators and
improve the sustainability of their public debt.
TABLE 11
Latin America (eight northern countries): contribution to the deterioration
of public finances made by the four adverse effects of sudden stop
(Percentages of GDP and percentages)
Indicator/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican Rep.
Required trend primary
surplus with sudden stop 2.3 3.9 2.1 14.8 -1.6 8.8 6.6 -2.3
Required trend primary
surplus without sudden stop -0.4 0.9 0.0 7.3 -2.8 -6.0 2.6 -4.8
Difference caused by
the sudden stop 2.7 3.0 2.1 7.6 1.2 14.8 3.9 2.5
Contribution of depreciation 1.7 0.0 6.6 46.1 -11.7 -11.7 1.4 -12.4
Contribution of lower growth 39.4 47.7 36.8 8.9 41.7 80.4 43.4 51.4
Contribution of the rise
in interest rates 43.9 28.3 26.7 28.2 51.7 27.9 37.1 52.5
Contribution of contingent
liabilities 15.0 24.0 29.9 16.9 18.2 3.3 18.0 8.5
Total of the four adverse effects 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Author's calculations on the basis of official figures.
22 The table contains three items with negative signs that could be
considered aberrations. Moreover, in the case of Panama, rounding
makes the figure for the effect of depreciation slightly positive when
it should be zero.
TABLE 12
Northern Latin American countries: projected GDP
growth for 2005 and 2006
(Percentages)
Year/country Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Dominican  Rep.
2005 3.0 2.5 3.0 4.5 3.6 4.0 4.5 3.5
2006 3.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.0
Source: ECLAC (2005).
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Other important factors in the context an analysis
of public debt sustainability are family remittances,
tourism and the maquila industry. Current transfers
continue to grow strongly, thanks mainly to the
buoyancy of family remittances. This source of foreign
exchange contributes the equivalent of 10%-20% of
GDP to all the countries analysed, except Costa Rica,
Mexico and Panama. This means that those
remittances could be a source of foreign currency that
is possibly independent, and perhaps stable and
growing, even in the event of a sudden stop in foreign
capital inflows.
The tourism and maquila industries are also
dynamic. Both suffered setbacks between 2001 and 2003,
but they are now recovering strongly in several countries.
Nonetheless, there are significant differences between
them. While the maquila industry was the engine of
growth in the 1990s, it does not look like repeating that
role in the new decade. Competition from China and
high production costs in some of the countries analysed
have reduced its viability. In contrast, tourism is booming
in nearly all these countries, specially in Honduras and
Nicaragua. This means a large inflow of foreign exchange
through foreign direct investment and tourist arrivals.
V
Conclusions
The macroeconomic setting in 2005-2006 is likely to
be relatively benign, but with a clear tendency to
deteriorate. The fact that economic growth is moderate
or even high in some countries facilitates debt service.
The rise in international interest rates is a risk factor
but, if this occurs gradually as it has thus far, it should
not be an insuperable obstacle for economic policy. On
the positive side, there is a stable and growing supply
of foreign exchange stemming from family remittances,
tourism and the maquila industry. This eases the
problem of currency mismatch in several of the
countries studied considerably.
The analysis above suggests caution with
regard to the future trend of the public debt.
Several countries are vulnerable in this respect,
even apart from the two most heavily indebted,
namely Honduras and Nicaragua. Economic policy
needs to give greater priority to public-debt
management over the next few years. Permanent
monitoring would help identify potential problems
early and make it possible to take corrective
measures. It would also be advisable to put an end
to the under-recording that conceals the true
dimensions of the public debt and the fiscal reality of
government finances. Lastly, and perhaps most
importantly, fiscal policy should continue to work
towards consolidation through reforms that strengthen
public revenues.
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